Abstract
Introduction
A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is formed on-the-fly and it is also a convenient infrastructureless communication network. We can construct MANET on demand without support from central servers. MANETs can be applied in critical communication situations such as battlefield, emergency and rescue missions. In the mean time, MANETs have the following inherent characteristics: open medium, absence of fixed central structure, dynamically changing topology, constrained capability, etc, so MANETs are highly vulnerable to various security threats. The research on key management schemes becomes the focus of attention, but so far, most of the existing schemes are either incomplete or not appropriate for small resource constrained devices.
MANETs are peer network and each node has equal function. On the one hand, we should construct distributed KDC(key distributing centre). On the other hand, when the size of MANETs increases, node join and node leave will result in all MANETs nodes' key update. This will bring some problems such as the increase of traffic and computation quantity. In order to solve this problem, we must classify all nodes into different security levels. So, we can get the following network topology structure: all nodes are classified as multi-cluster and the cluster head is selected. The cluster head is responsible for special tasks such as key management and trust management. The detailed function of cluster head should be confirmed by the designer. Literature [1] described three methods which cluster head often adopts in node secure communication as follows: 1) All nodes communicate with symmetric cryptography, and nodes use unified key to realize authentication. Cluster head is only used as key distribution node. 2) Cluster head take on the task of distributing CA (certificate authorization), it can produce and distribute certificate by getting together with other nodes. Cluster head node can also provide all certificate functions for its internal nodes. 3) As a node of distributing CA, cluster head can issue certificate for all nodes of the MANETs. These certificates can be authenticated between different clusters. Nodes within one cluster apply symmetric key to realize communications. Nodes which belong to different clusters should be cross authenticated via different cluster heads. This method can make the ad hoc network adapt to the dynamic topology efficiently, and key management and authentication scheme can be neatly designed.
Based on ECC(Elliptic Curve Cryptography) and IBE(Identity Based Encryption) schemes, we apply bilinear pair computation to realize secure key management and communication. With Shamir's (n, t) threshold key management scheme, we construct three-level security ad hoc network. This scheme can be neatly applied to the dynamic topology and different sizes of ad hoc network in which our supposed network topology structure is multi-cluster classified to form large network. This scheme does not need certificate management, and has simple key distribution process. It can get high security with few traffic and computation quantities. Besides, node can join the network and leave the network neatly and securely.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the previous work related to key management of MANETs. Section III introduces the preliminaries knowledge of bilinear pairing and threshold technique. Section IV presents our key management scheme which includes security parameter initialization and secure communication, key updates, etc. Section V evaluates the performance of the proposal in detail. Finally, section VI presents the conclusion.
Related works
Key management schemes of MANETs have been discussed by rich literatures. These schemes can be mainly classified as three types: the Symmetric Key Cryptography scheme, the Asymmetric Key Cryptography scheme and the Group Key Management scheme.
Individual and group authentication models for wireless network have been discussed in many literatures such as [2] [3] . Certificate authorities (CA) which is the vulnerable part in network are usually adopted by the traditional Asymmetric Key Cryptography scheme [4] . As long as CA is not distributed, CA may be infiltrated by adversary with subscriber certificate, personate certificate and removing certificate. CA must ensure availability at any time to perform key management. CA is designed to manage node key's update in the system, and issue certificate for the node that is joining the system. In MANET, the credit of single CA can be distributed to a group of nodes which are responsible for key management together. Such a scheme includes: partly distributed authentication scheme and entirely distributed authentication scheme, self-signed certificate, identity-based authentication scheme, and combined public key cryptography scheme.
The Symmetric Key Cryptography scheme [5] can usually be applied to MANET. These schemes are based on the key deployed in advance which include single key used by all nodes. Each node shares a single key with another single node or multi-nodes. These schemes can be divided into two categories: determinate key management scheme and stochastic key management scheme.
Secure group communication of MANET demands the Group Key Management scheme. The donated group key security protocol should solve such problems as group key produce, group key update regularity, group key update when a node member joins in or a node member leaves etc. These group key management schemes can be divided into three basic categories: centralized group key agreement protocols (CGKAP), decentralized group key management protocols with relaying (DeGKMP), and distributed group key agreement protocols (DiGKAP). CGKAP schemes [6] mainly depend on group controller (GC) to realize the security of group key. The problems in centralized schemes include performance bottleneck, the central point failure and the unrealistic demand for trusted centralized authority in MANET. DeGKMP [7] divides a big group into several subgroups, and each subgroup has a subgroup controller (SC) which is responsible for key management. The unsolved problem is that centralized nodes also exist in DeGKMP. Another problem is that it will produce a lot of communications burden for relaying messages of SC in MANET. DiGKAP [8] schemes generate the group key by uniform distribution from all members, and each member is assumed to have equal work load. The computation cost needed on all members is also uniform, all members generate group key through cooperation. Compared with CGKAP and DeGKMP, DiGKAP is more suitable to be applied in MANETs. In addition, schemes in [9] introduce a hybrid group key agreement, we can also use this scheme in ad hoc network.
In fact, the first need of MANET security communication is identity authentication which is based on asymmetric key cryptography, and the second need is secret message communication based on symmetric key cryptography. So, a lot of suitable choices for the key management scheme of MANETs are presented with both asymmetric cryptography and symmetric cryptography. In general, the key management scheme of MANET should be realized on line.
Asymmetric Key Cryptography schemes usually depend on certificate based cryptography (CBC), which uses public key certificates to authenticate public key. The CBC-based scheme need certificate based public-key generation and distribution. These schemes don't fit for MANETs because they may cause both unfavorable communication latency and tremendous communication overhead.
In ID-based cryptography, public keys can be derived from entities' known identity information. ID-based cryptography eliminated the need for public key distribution and certificates. So, ID-based cryptography has become a very important tool in research on MANETs' key management.
Several practical identity-based schemes [10, 11, 12 ] have been presented since 1984. Boneh and Franklin devised the first functional identity-based encryption scheme (IBE) in 2001 [13] . They cleverly used bilinear map (the Weil or Tate pairing) over super-singular elliptic curve [14] . B.Lynn extended the Boneh-Franklin scheme to build an efficient authenticated IBE scheme [15] . Since that time, many other identity-based security schemes for different purposes [16, 17, 18] have been devised.
IBE schemes require a trusted third party (also called PKG) to be involved on-line in performing the cryptographic operations which can be used to generate and distribute private keys. Its disadvantages include: 1) a bottleneck on the PKG will be created and will become an obstacle for an efficient key management scheme. 2) PKG knows each user's secret, which may cause the problem of key escrow.
The key management service is distributed among certain number of PKGs to improve the IBE scheme. Several parties could share the secret through an (t, n) threshold scheme, only more than t parties out of n PKGs could cooperate to generate a valid public/private key that executes key management services.
Preliminaries

Secret Sharing
In order to share a secret among n users, we usually adopt secret sharing technique. Later, all the shareholders can get together and recover the secret. We can not recover or reconstruct the secret for less than the needed number of users.
A (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme based on polynomial interpolations has been proposed by Shamir in [21] . This scheme is described below: 1) Select t points on the plane, (x1,y1), …, (xt, yt), every xi is distinct, there exists an unique polynomial f of degree t-1,such that f(xi) = yi for all i=1,2,3,…,t . After getting the t points, one can recover f by using the Lagrange interpolation formula.
2) This also holds in the field Zp, p is prime. By doing the following steps, we can share a secret S among t parties: 1) Let S be the secret chosen from Zp, p is prime.
2) Select a random polynomial f(x) = f 0 + f 1 x + …+ f t-1 x t-1 , under the condition that f 0 = S and f 1 , f 2 , … , f t-1 are chosen randomly from Zp.
3) For all i ∈[1,t], distribute the shares Si = ( i, f( i ) ) to the i-th party.
If the secret has been shared, we can now reconstruct it from every subset of t shares by the Lagrange formula. When given t points (xi, yi), i =1,…, t , we get
In a word, Shamir's secret sharing scheme does not depend on the computational power of any party, and it is perfectly secure, flexible and efficient. 
Bilinear Map and Pairing Theory
The method of bilinear map and pairing should be adopted in practice for efficiency and security. Its basic theory in detail is discussed in the following.
Suppose p, q be two large primes. Literature [11, 12] gave the conditions that p, q must satisfy. E/Fp indicate an elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax + b over the finite field Fp. G1 denote a qorder subgroup of the additive group of points of E/Fp, and G2 denote a q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group of the finite field Fp. The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) should be hard in both G1 and G2. For us, a pairing is a map : G1×G1→G2 with the following properties:
Consequently, for∨ a, b ∈Z q * , we have
2) Non degenerate: for all P,Q∈G1 , such that
3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute (P,Q) for all P,Q∈G1 . The Bilinear Diffe-Hellman Problem (BDHP) is hard. Examples of such bilinear maps include modified Weil [19] and Tate [20] pairings in which we can get more comprehensive description of how these pairing parameters should be selected in practice for efficiency and security.
Our Management Scheme
Our three-level Key Management Scheme is based on cluster and tree structure which will be discussed in detail in the following.
System Parameters initialization
It is well known that node's public key is computed by using a one-way hash function and node's own identity in identity-based public key cryptography. The system parameters can be selected by trusted third party public key generation center (PKGC). The PKGC runs the common parameter initialization algorithm A. It works as follows:
1) Suppose a security parameter k ∈ Z+ , runs A with input k to generate a prime q (q is large enough to make it infeasible to solve discrete logarithm problem in G1 and G2), G1, G2 are two cycle groups of order q, and P is the generator of G 1 , and an admissible bilinear map eˆ : G1×G1→G2.
2) Select two hash functions h 0 : {0, 1}*→G1, which maps arbitrary binary strings to nonzero elements in G1, h 1 : {0, 1}*→Z P *, which maps arbitrary binary strings to integers in Z P *.
3) PKGC chooses stochastic number S PKG ∈Z P * as its own private key, and the corresponding public key is Q PKG =S PKG P∈G 1 .
4) Suppose (E K ,D K ) is a pair of symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm. For participator ui (i=1, 2,…,n), its public key is Q i =h 0 (ID i ) and its private key is S i =S PKG Q i .
5) The system common parameters (P, q, e, h 0 , h 1 , G1,G2, S PKG ) are pre-distributed to each PKG node through TTP. Figure 1 shows the three-level key management scheme in MANETs. TTP can only be applied in the phase of MANET initialization which will be discussed in the following paragraph. After initialization process, TTP is in off-line state. Cluster head C is charged with two tasks: 1) It realizes three-level distributed KDC, carry through system key management. First, every node in the third layer cluster can produce distributed secrete share by (t,n) threshold cryptography scheme. Each cluster head in the third layer cluster can hold public/private key pair of its own cluster. Second, cluster head in the third layer produce public key with its own identities. It regards the third layer cluster main private key as the second layer cluster private key share which will get together to produce the second layer cluster main private key by (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme. With the same manner, every cluster head in the second layer may regard its cluster main private key as private key share in the first cluster, and then we can get node public key/private key of the first layer cluster. In the end, we can get the first layer cluster main public key/private key by applying (n,t) threshold secret sharing scheme. 2) Cluster head C has the whole functions of distributing key management for those nodes belonging to cluster head C.
Suppose every node has only one ID (such as network card MAC address) number in the temporary ad hoc network. Different node has different ID number. Each node has the ability of finding neighbor node and acquiring its ID information. In the mean time, node has the function of monitoring neighbor node behavior and judging if a neighbor node is a hostile node or a shadiness node.
Before MANET is formed, the initial set of participating nodes had got the system parameters which are adopted by the MANET. Each node of this set has the same common parameters. When a new node wants to join the MANET, it will first be authenticated by its neighboring nodes, and then the node and the other nodes belonging to the same cluster can form a threshold-based Private Key Generation service (PKG), in which a new master public key is generated for the identity-based cryptosystem and a new master secret key is shared among the nodes. They are in a threshold (t-out-of-n) manner such that fewer than t nodes cannot recover the new master secret key. Then the join node can obtain corresponding personal private key by having a share of their private keys from each of the t nodes that formed the PKG. If we have correct t-shares, corresponding node can compute its personal private key. Personal public key can be got by using a one-way hash function and its own identity.
Anyway, when a new node joins the network, it must first be authenticated by a set of nodes of the MANET and then construct a new master secret key of the MANET by t neighboring nodes. In order to resist mobile adversaries' attack, we have evolved Shamir's (t,n) threshold secret share scheme in the MANET.
Construct Three-level Key Management Schemes
Literature [22] indicates that in three layer network topology structure, if we adopt distributed structure as the first layer network, centralized structure as the second layer network and the third layer network (DCC), it costs less in communication to acquire the same security performance when compared with other network topology structure.
The structure in figure 1 is DCC mode. The first layer network adopts distributed key management in which Shamir (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme is applied to management of public key/private key of the cluster main key and each node's key in the cluster.
When the node in the first layer is cluster head and the nodes in second layer are cluster members, we can get the key management methods of the second layer cluster as follows: If a node wants to join or leave the cluster, we adopt distributed key management mode in order to ensure secure key distribution.
When nodes in the second layer cluster or in the third layer cluster communicate with each other, this cluster topology structure becomes tree structure and the cluster head becomes tree root. The key management mode in the third layer network is the same as the mode in the second layer network.
In the following, we will separately investigate node public key/private key management in distributed key management manner, point to point secure communication channel setup, group key management content, etc. Then we will evaluate this security scheme.
Forming of the MANET Secure Channel
When a set of nodes are ready to form a MANET, they authenticate and communicate on the master public key and master private key. The node's identity-based public key system is constructed by master private key and node's identity. Now we will discuss secure channel. If node ui wants to send message m j to node uj securely, it will do the following things:
1) It randomly selects x j ∈Z P *,and calculate k j =(k j,1 ,k j,2 )=h 1 ( (Q j ,Q PKG ) xj ); ui calculates r j = m j kj,2 , c j = E kj,1 (m j ||r j ), R j =r j Q i and s j =x j Q PKG -r j S i ∈G 1 ;
2) ui sends (c j , s j , R j ) to the receiver uj.
After receiving the message (c j , s j , R j ), uj calculates k j =(k j,1 ,k j,2 )=h 1 ( (Q j , s j ) (S j , R j )). Then uj decrypts c j and gets m j ||r j = D kj,1 (c j ), if r j = m j kj,2 is correct, uj will think the secret is sent successfully.
Master Key Form and Update
In the scheme we will improve Shamir's secret sharing. After the MANET is formed, the master public/private key pair should be formed and then be updated through the MANET nodes' cooperation. Each node Vi randomly chooses a secret f i0 and a polynomial f i (x) = f i0 + f i1 x + …+ f i,t-1 x t-1 (mod q), and f i (0) = f i0 . Through the polynomial, node V i can compute S ij = f i (j) and S i,i+1 = f i (i+1) for i= 1,2, …, n and j= 1,2, …, n. as his share for node V j . V i sends S ij and S i,i+1 to V j by a securely channel which has been described above. Node V j may construct its share of master private key from the n receiving shares. So
So, any coalition of t shareholders could jointly recover the secret using ∑ i=1 t K i l i (x) mod q where l i (x) is the Lagrange coefficient. It is easy to see that the jointly updated master private key is
After S PKG (new) is produced above, we will not worry about adversary's attack on (t,n) secret share scheme. Even if the adversary get ∑ i=1 t K i l i (0 ), we can also use the S PKG (new) securely. We have chosen P as the generator of G 1 in the phase of System parameters initialization. Each shareholder publishes K i P by sharing the master private key. Then the master public key could be computed as Q PKG (new)= S PKG (new)P.
Node identity-based Public Key and Private Key Update
If a node in MANET wants to obtain its own public/private key pair, it should contact at least t neighbor nodes, present its identity and send the requests to t PKGs nodes in order to acquire identity-based public key and private key.
All the network nodes share the master private key, and each of these nodes could be the PKG service node. Having received the request signal, the t nodes work together to issue the public key / private key pair for the request node.
For the identity-based cryptosystem, the public key may be hash function of arbitrary string which can be MAC address, e-mail address, etc. In this scheme, we add a time stamp to the arbitrary string, to make MANET avoid the inconvenient situation when the private key is lost.
Once the public key expires, the node's new public key and corresponding private key must be obtained.
Public key is constructed as pkID = h 0 (ID||Time), where h 0 is a cryptographic hash function and ID is the identity of the requesting node, Time is the current time. After acquiring the public key, each of the PKGs service nodes should cooperate to gain the corresponding private key sk. Each node of the PKGs computes s ij =K i h 0 (ID j ||Time) (i =1,…, m, m>t), and sends it to the requesting node V j . After collecting all the correct shares of the private keys, the requesting node V j can construct its own private key as S PKGj = ∑ i=1 m s ij .
Node Join
If a new node V m wants to join the MANET, it will first randomly choose a secret f m0 and a polynomial f m (x) = f m0 + f m1 x + …+ f m,t-1 x t-1 (mod q), and f m (0) = f m0 . Then it will broadcast its public identity ID m to the specific m' update nodes.
After getting m' (n ≥ m' ≥ t-1) nodes identity response in a cluster of the MANET, node V m sends f m (j) and f m (m+1) to node j , then m' nodes can acquire new cluster public key /shared private key by master key update algorithm described above, where n is the total number of the cluster nodes. We can get m' nodes'
(k is a fixed number, t-1≥ j ≥1).Then the m' nodes can get the new master public key by means of [
, and one of the m' nodes can send the new master private key to the new node V m . Then the joined node can get new master public key, its share of the new master private key and personal private key.
The other (n-m') nodes in the cluster should update their new master public key / master private key and personal private key as follows. Any node V j' in the m' nodes will encrypt the new master private key S PKG (new) by Q PKG (old) and then it broadcasts the encrypted message to the other (n-m') nodes. Each node in this cluster will update its master public key and node private key through the methods introduced above.
After each node obtains master private key / public key, the m' update nodes can cooperate to produce the new share by constructing the partial share as 
. When a new node joins the cluster, nodes in the cluster only update the cluster master key (public key / private key) in the cluster. But they will keep old / new key. And nodes in other cluster will not update their key. When a node in the cluster communicates with other cluster nodes, it should adopt old key. And it only adopts new key when communicating with the new node of the cluster. New node will be monitored by the other nodes of the cluster and it can communicate only within the joined cluster, after some time, the new node can be confirmed to be believable, then the new key will be accepted by other cluster. The monitor algorithm can be found in many literatures.
Node Leave
If the leaving node is located in the third layer, the node should be deleted by the other nodes which are in the cluster. This will arouse a share key update process described above. Then the cluster form from the third layer cluster head will update its own cluster key by master key update process. In this situation, the third layer cluster head will select polynomial ft(x) = ft1x + …+ ft,t-1x t-1 (mod q), and calculate ft(i) (i=1,…,n-1) for every node i .Then, the cluster head will broadcast all ft(i) . After receiving these value ft(i), node i will calculate the new value Ki(new) = Ki(old)+ft(i). Obviously, the master key indicated in equation (6) will not change as ft(0)=0. Key updates take place only in the third layer.
If the left node was a cluster head of the third layer cluster, then it was also located in the second layer. When it departs from the cluster, a new node in the third layer cluster should be selected as the new cluster head at once. There are two modes to update the key.
Mode one is to update the third layer cluster master key which will be the second layer cluster node's share key. Then the second layer cluster will update its key by means of master key form and update. Finally the first layer cluster will update its key in the same way that the second layer adopted. So all nodes key share in the MANET will be changed.
Mode two is to change only the share key value, but not the master key value. The new third layer cluster head can generate a random share update polynomial ft(x) = ft1x + …+ ft,t-1x t-1 (mod q), such that ft (0) = 0 to ensure S PKG (new) is not changed. Then the cluster head should calculate the other nodes' part share value ft(i) (i=1,…,n-1) and broadcast the value ft(i) (i=1,…,n-1) to other nodes. Each node i of the third cluster will get the new share key Ki(new)=Ki(old)+ ft(i) (i=1,…,n-1). Obviously, the key S PKG (new) will not change.
In mode two, each node in the second layer is a cluster head node of a cluster in the third layer. So the third layer cluster master key will be the second layer cluster node's share key. The third layer cluster master key will not change and the second layer master key can also remain unchanged. In order to get the same master key, the second layer node should select the share update polynomial fu(x) = f1x + …+ ft-1x t-1 (mod q), such that fu (0) = 0 to ensure each node can change its share key value but the master key S PKG of the second layer will not be changed.
If the left node was located in the first layer, as it was also the cluster head node of the second layer cluster, it will bring the similar problem that the leaving of the second layer cluster node will produce. After it departs from the cluster, the nodes in the second layer cluster should select a new cluster head node right away. Then we also have two modes to change each node's share key which are similar to those in the second layer.
Mode one is to change the master key of the first layer cluster and the second layer cluster. In this situation, we will first update the first layer's master key by means of node master key form and update. The new selected second layer cluster head can receive the new first layer cluster share key which is also the master key of the second layer cluster, and then the cluster head will send the new master key of the second layer cluster to the all cluster nodes through the secure channel described above. But the other nodes of the first layer cluster are also cluster heads of the second layer cluster, as the left node can not know the accurate key share value of 
The Security and Efficiency of the Scheme
The proposed identity-based key management scheme has a low communication overhead and reduced computational consumption when compared with certificate-based key management.
1) It adopts ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography), the scheme provides high security level with 160 bit keys and is equivalent in strength to RSA with 1024 bit. So, based on each node's identity, the public/private key can be much shorter compared with the public key in RSA cryptosystem. 2) In order to ensure node identity is authenticated and secure communication is acquired, we preload the initial security parameters for each node. We don't need any certificate in the scheme. 3) We improve Shamir (t,n) threshold secret share scheme as follows: we don't need update subshare secret regular to resist on adversary, for we introduce an appended random term in the final master secret key. 4) We construct a three-level key management scheme which reduce the burden of a big MANETs and add the security of the network. Our scheme has DCC three-level structure, so it has less communication overhead.
For example, when compared with the key management scheme in literature [1] , our scheme don't need many memories to save keys for symmetric key encryption communication. When compared with the scheme in literature [24] , our scheme overcomes the obvious deficiency that it has no identity authentication when two nodes communicate with each other.
In a word, the ID-based three-level key management scheme should be an efficient and security alternative when compared with the traditional certificate-based method.
Conclusion and Future Work
In summary, the proposed scheme is based on identity-based and threshold three-level key management scheme which adopts Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in this paper. It is well known that ECC is appropriate for such nodes due to its smaller keys and its higher security levels. (t, n) threshold secret sharing algorithm has been improved to resist adversary's attack and ensure availability of network services, such as key generation and key distribution. The pairing technology provides authentication and confidentiality with reduced communication overhead and computational cost. Our scheme with the identity-based and threshold cryptography can satisfy the secure requirements of MANET.
In the future, we will simulate our scheme in detail. Based on the simulation results, we will improve our scheme in order to get the most efficient scheme.
